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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
A. NORMAN GROVER; ARTHUR N. 
GROVER; ESTELLA V. GROVER; 
FLOYD E. GROVER; FAY G. WIGHT; 
AMY G. JENSEN; MAX L. GROVER; 
JESSE G. PARRY; JOYCE ANNA G. 
SMITH and JUNE G. HUFFMAN, 
Pl.aintif f s and Appell.ants, 
vs. 
OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B. GARN, 
his wife; DARVEL GARN and BONNIE 
L. GARN, his wife; CLIVE GARN and 
ALOHA GARN, his wife; and ARTHUR 
N. GROVER FARMS, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ARTHUR N. GROVER FARMS, INC., a 
corporation, 
Pl.aintif f and ApPell.ant, 
vs. 
OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B. GARN, 
his wife; DARVEL GARN and BONNIE 
L. GARN, his wife; and CLIVE GARN 
and ALOHA GARN, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Civil No. 
10038 
Civil No. 
10081 
APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASES 
The above cases seek to cancel a contract of sale 
whereby Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc., a family cor-
poration organized under the law of Utah, agreed to 
2 
sell and convey to the defendants Garn substantially all 
of the assets of the corporation, consisting of several 
hundred acres of farm land, water rights and grazing 
permits, located in Oneida County, Idaho. The validity 
of the contract was assailed npon the grounds: 
( 1) that the sale was not authorized by the board 
of directors nor approved by the stockholders as required 
by Section 16-10-74, U.C.A. (1953); 
(2) that the officer who purportedly executed the 
contract on behalf of the corporation had no authority 
to execute it on behalf of the corporation; 
(3) that the officer who executed the contract on 
behalf of the corporation was aged, infirm, ill and incom-
petent to act as an agent of the corporation or to under-
stand the nature or legal effect of the contract and was 
unduly influenced by her husband to execute it; 
( 4) the contract is invalid because it requires the 
buyer of the property to pay the purchase price to a 
single stockholder and includes property which the cor-
poration did not own. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The same judgment and decree was entered in each 
case, adjudging that the individual plaintiffs have no 
standing as stockholders or otherwise to attack the sale 
or contract of sale and their alleged cause of action be 
dismissed with prejudice; that Arthur N. Grover and 
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Estella V. Grover, his wife, were physically and mentally 
capable of understanding and appreciating the contract 
of sale and Pxercised their own free will in the execution 
thereof; that Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc. is but the 
instrumentality through which the said Arthur N. Grover 
and Estella V. Grover, the owners of the stock thereof, 
for conveniencP, transacted their business; that "the 
Court hereby pierces the corporate veil" and decrees 
that the statute relating to corporations and meetings of 
stockholdPrs was either complied with or waived when 
the owners of the stock entered into the contract of sale; 
that Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc., Arthur N. Grover 
individually and Estella V. Grover individually, are 
bound as a corporation and as individuals by the con-
tract of sale; that Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. 
Grover, individually, and the corporation, by their acts 
and deeds, are estopped from declaring said contract 
of sale is of no force or effect and that each of the 
causes of action in the above numbered cases be dismiss-
ed ~with prejudice. Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. 
Grover,, individually, and the corporation, were ordered 
to file with the escrow holder 50 shares of stock in a 
water compan>-, and in the event of their failure to do 
so, jurisdiction to fix any consequent damage was re8erv-
ed. A rnone~· judgment in the sum of $525.00 and at-
torney's fees in the sum of $5,000.00 was entered against 
the corporation and Arthur and Estella Grover indi-
vidually. Specific performance of the contract of sale 
was also decreed. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the entire judgment 
and decree appealed from and a remand of the cases 
to the lower court with instructions to enter judgment 
in favor of appellants, canceling the contract of sale, 
quieting the corporation's title to the lands described in 
the contract and requiring the respondents to render an 
accounting of their operations of the farm and for all 
costs incurred. 
SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS 
Case number 10038 originated with the filing of a 
ocmplaint by A. Norman Grover against the seller and 
the buyers in the contract of sale. The complaint was 
signed by the plaintiff but not by any attorney. Plaintiff 
identified himself as a stockholder of A. N. Grover 
Farms, Inc. Arthur N. Grover, Estella V. Grover, Floyd 
E. Grover, Fay G. -Wight, Amy G. Jensen, Max L. 
Grover, Jesse G. Parry, Joyce Anna G. Smith and June 
G. Huffman were added as parties plaintiff by order of 
the court. 
The complaint attacked the validity of the contract 
of sale upon the ground that it was not authorized by 
the directors or stockholders of the seller as required by 
Section 16-10-74. 
The individual defendants filed an answer, counter-
claim and cross complaint. The answer, which is a con-
glomeration of admissions, denials, affirmative defenses 
and immaterial allegations, denies that plaintiff was a 
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stockholder of the seller at the time of the sale and al-
leges he had no right to question the validity of the con-
tract. The counterclaim sought to recover from the plain-
tiff damages in the amount of $25,000 on account of his 
malicious interference with the sale, and a like amount 
as exemplary damages. 
The cross claim is directed against the corporation 
and alleges that it agreed to deposit with the escrow 
holder fifty shares of Lone Spring ViiT ater and sixty-five 
sharet-; of Taylor Grazing. and failed to do so. An order 
requiring compliance with this undertaking is prayed 
for. 
At this point, the plaintiff appeared by his attorney, 
Richard L. Dewsnup, and denied each and every allega-
tion of the counterclaim. A short time later, the cross 
defendant appeared by its attorney, E. J. Skeen, and 
replied to the cross claim. 
""\Ye no-w turn to civil number 10081. This case got 
nnder \vay by a complaint by Arthur N. Grover Farms, 
Inc., a corporation, against the Garns, who are the pur-
chasers under the contract of sale. This complaint as-
st•rted that the buyers had not performed the contract 
and that it had been terminated by the plaintiff. The 
defendants answered and counterclaimed. The same con-
fused denials, admissions, affirmative defenses and im-
material matter appeared in the defendants' answer as 
in their answer in 10038. The counterclaim seeks the 
same damages, punitive damages and order as the cross 
claim in 10038. The plaintiff replied to the counterclaim 
by specific admissions and denials. Mr. Skeen withdrew 
as attorney for the the plaintiff and attorney L. Brent 
Hogan appeared and filed an amended complaint which 
attacked the contract of sale upon the grounds set forth 
in the above statement of kind of cases. An amended and 
supplemental complaint was thereafter filed by attorney 
E. J. Skeen. This pleading repeats substantially thP 
amended complaint but adds that a confidential adyisor 
of Arthur N. Grover assisted tlw dPf endants in obtaining 
the unconscionable contract of sale. An altPrnative claim 
for a money judgment was asserted in the eYent the con-
tract was adjudged to be valid. The defrndants answered 
and reasserted the counterclaim. It "·as stipulated that 
the amended complaint filed by attorney L. Brent Hogan 
should be withdrawn. Mr. Hogan then withdrew from the 
case as attorney for the plaintiff. 
Defendants moved that the two cases be consolidated 
for trial. No ruling upon this motion appears in the rec-
ord, but the cases were in fact consolidated for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Arthur N. Grover Farms. Inc. was incorporated un-
der the laws of Utah in 1963 by Fay G. 'Vight, Estella 
V. Grover and Arthur N. Grover. The Grovers are the 
parents of Fay G. Wight and the: other individual plain-
tiffs. By the terms of the Articles of Incorporation, it 
was empowered to engage in farming and also to bny, 
sell, exchange, lease and rent real and personal prop-
erty and to process, sell and otherwise dispose of all 
crops and products of the soil. The capital stock of the 
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corporation consisted of 100 shares having no par value. 
The incorporaton; were made directors and officers of 
the company. Fay G. Wight was made President, her 
mother, Vice President, and her father, Secretary and 
Treasurer (Ex. 10). The court found that 91 shares of 
the stock were issued in exchange for the property cov-
en•d h~- the contract of sale (R. 876). A copy of the con-
tract of sale is attached to the complaint in case munber 
10081. The original appears to have been executed on 
hehalf of the corporation by Estella Y. Grover, Vice 
PrPsidvnt. It is attested by Arthur N. Grover, Secretary 
(R. 900) and is dated October 1, 1964. 
It is ad111ith·d by all parties that no resolution of 
the board of directors authorizing sale was ever adopted; 
that no meeting of the board of directors was ever called 
or lwld or any notice of any meeting given prior to the 
signing of the contract, and that no stockholders' meet-
ing was ewr called or held prior to the sale. None of the 
eight children who "·ere stockholders of the corporation 
u\·er consented to or approved the sale. On the contrary, 
all of them met after the sale and unanimously repudi-
ated it. They directed Norman to bring suit to cancel it 
(R. 113, 183, 190, 263, 345-361). 
rrhe property covered by the contract of sale includ-
ed substantially all of the assets of the corporation. It 
also included shares of water stock and Taylor Grazing 
pt:•rmits which were not owned by the corporation. One 
Hundred Twenty acres of the farm was excluded from 
the contract since it had been transferred to one of the 
children. 
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At the time the corporation was formed, 45 shares 
of the stock were issued to Arthur N. Grover, 45 shares 
to Estella V. Grover, and one share to Mrs. Wight. The 
stock book (Ex. 9) shows that shares were issued in May, 
July and September of 1963 to <>ach of the eight children. 
The stub book was conformed to the issue dates in Aug-
ust, 1964 (Ex. 9, R. 170-179). Prior to tht' sale, Mrs. 
Grover gave each of her eight children five of her shares 
of stock. The transfers were made in 1964 (R. 170-179). 
Accordingly, at the time of the sale in October, 1964, 
each of the eight children owned five shares of stock 
except Fay, who had six shares. The mother had five 
shares and the father 45 shares (R. 207. Ex. 6-8, 18-30). 
Following the execution of the contract of sale, an 
escrow agreement was signed by the buyer and seller 
providing for the deposit of a deed to be delivered to 
the buyer on payment of the purchase price. It was ex-
ecuted on behalf of the corporation by Estella V. Grover, 
Vice President. The purchase price of the property was 
to be paid to Mr. or Mrs. A. N. Grover (Ex. 48). 
Both Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover were 
past 80 years of age at the time of the sale. Mrs. Grover 
was confined to her home by a serious heart condition 
and was practically blind (R. 10). She was not present 
at the bank where the transaction was closed, and the 
certificate of the notary that she personally appeared 
before him as signer of the escrow agreement is false. 
She had no recollection of signing the contract, the deed 
or the escrow insrtuction, and testified that she never 
had any intention of selling or disposing of the farm 
(R. 814, 816, 817, 818, 819). She testified further that the 
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sale was contrary to her wishes; that she had transferred 
to her children practically all of the stock she owned (R. 
813, 814). She was practically blind and could see only 
with the aid of a ma1:,rnifying glass. She was so weak she 
required constant care and attention (R. 104-108). 
In SeptembE'r of 19G4, Arthur N. Grover who ap-
pears to have conducted all of the negotiations leading 
up to the sale, suffered a blackout while attempting to 
crank a tractor on the farm. He was unconscious for six 
hours when he was discovered by acquaintances who ad-
ministered to him a home n'medy containing strychnine 
and quinirn• (R. 76-77). 
The evidence discloses that on or about October 1, 
19G4, Arthur N. Gronr was ill, infirm and unable to 
understand. perceive, remember or exercise normal judg-
ment in the ordinary affairs of life. The two doctors who 
attended him during this period of time so testified. Dr. 
Robinson treated Arthur N. Grover for many years and 
saw him immediately following the episode which oc-
curred in September of 1964. At that time he noticed 
that his patient had suffned brain damage by reason of 
the episode of unconsciousness (R. 284, 287, 292). This 
brain damage was demonstrated by a halting gait, 
tremor, loss of memory for recent events, hostility, agi-
tation and a marked personality change. The arterio-
sclerosis which the doctor had observed prior to the Sep-
tember incident was described as a cause of the brain 
clot which induced the unconsciousness. The patient was 
also suffering from a nephritic condition resulting in 
nocturia which was caused by the sclerosis and was evi-
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dence that the sclerosis existed in an advanced state (R. 
285-294,306,308,309,312). 
Dr. Felt had observed Mr. Grover for several years 
both before and after October, 1964. During a part of 
this period of time he had treated him as a patient. He 
noted a sudden change which took place in his patient 
after the incident of September, 1964. This change was 
demonstrated by faulty gait and tremor, marked per-
sonality alteration and significant personality attitudes. 
These significant attitudes consisted of hostility, agi-
tation, delusions, paranoia, poor memory for recent 
events as opposed to good memory for remote events, 
physical deterioration demonstrated by further loss of 
hearing and sight and loss of weight (R. 313-323). 
The banker, Mr. Nelson, who closed the transaction, 
thought Arthur N. Grover was competent in 1964, but 
not competent at the time of the trial (R. 467). He was in-
definite in his mind as to when the incompetence first 
manifested itself (R. 468). One of his reasons for con-
cluding that Mr. Grover was incompetent at the time 
of the trial was because of Grover's inability to distin-
guish what property was his and what property belonged 
to someone else (R. 468). 
All children of Mr. Grover who testified noted that 
since the event of September, 1964, their father had 
shown a remarkable change. The hostility and agitation 
which he developed toward some people was demon-
strated by bizarre and abnormal conduct. All observed 
a rapid mental and physical deterioration demonstrated 
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by loss of memory, inability to understand and a strong 
tendency to illusions. One of his sons, Dr. Floyd Grover, 
found his father unable to understand or explain the 
transaction which had taken place involving the sale of 
the farm. Each time he tried to explain the purchase 
price he reached a different amount, varying as much 
as $20,000 (R. 261-262). 
Two of the Grover children had received several 
checks from their father during this critical period of 
time. Neither had cashed these checks because they were 
sure that their father did not realize what he was doing 
(R. 110, 114, 275 ). 
The Articles of Incorporation provide that the busi-
ness of the corporation shall be conducted by a board of 
three directors. Meetings of stockholders may be called 
by th<::~ president. or in the event of her failure or refusal 
to act, by a majority vote of the board of directors. 
N oticP of any meeting of stockholders, including the an-
nual meeting, must be given by written notice. The Ar-
ticles do not expressly authorize any officer or director 
to act on behalf of the corporation (Ex. 10). 
The president of the corporation had no knowledge 
of the sale of the property until after it had been con-
summated. There was no directors' meeting or stock-
holders' meeting held before the sale and no authority 
was given to the vice president to execute the contract 
or any other instrument on behalf of the corporation. 
The court found that none of the requirements of Sec-
tion 16-10-74 were complied with (R. 1037). The defend-
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ants were notified before they took possession of the 
property that the sale was not authorized and that what-
ever they did with respect to the property was at their 
own risk (R. 345-346). The trial court made no finding 
that the sale was made in the usual course of business 
of the corporation but the evidence clearly shows that 
the usual course of business of the corporation was farm-
mg. 
It is uncontroverted that the sale covered substan-
tially all of the assets of the corporation and that in 
effect it was a liquidation and termination of the business 
for which the corporation was organized. 
The contract of sale was prepared in the office of 
Mr. Skeen but it simply a redraft of Exhibit 33 which 
was drawn by the bank (R. 87). 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS INVALID 
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ANY ESTOP-
PEL OF THE CORPORATION TO DENY 
THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT. 
POINT III 
THE GROVERS ARE NOT PARTIES TO 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE, DID NOT EX-
13 
ECUTE IT AS INDIVIDUALS AND ARE 
NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE UNDER IT. 
POINT IY 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS PREPAR-
ED BY THE GROVERS AND THEIR AT-
TORNEY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS INVALID 
BECAUSE IT \VAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS. 
It is not controverted that the contract of sale cov-
ered substantially all of the assets of the corporation. 
One hundred twenty acres which had been given to one 
of the children was hacked out of the transaction. There 
were a few items of farm machinery not included in the 
contract, but then' is not sufficient evidence to indicate 
that the corporation ever owned them. 
It is beyond dispute that if the contract of sale is 
uphelp, the corporation will be stripped of the means 
of carrying on the business for which it was organized. 
It was incorporated for the purpose of operating the 
farm more particularly described in the contract of sale. 
The operation of this farm was the only business ever 
conducted by the corporation. 
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Respondents made a futile attempt to evade this 
situation by pointing out that the Articles empowered 
the corporation to buy and sell real estate. It is true 
that the corporation had this power, but it is also true 
that it never pretended to exercise it. It never did buy 
or sell any real estate either for itself or as agent for 
others. Every corporate activity that it ever carried on 
was confined to the operation of the farm. 
There is no escape from the conclusion that if the 
contract of sale is upheld it will operate as a liquidation 
of the assets and a distribution thereof to the stock-
holders. The purchase money paid automatically becomes 
a dividend within the meaning of the tax statutes. The 
tax impact on the transaction would be staggering. 
There can likewise be no controversy that this sale 
was not a sale made in the usual course of business of 
the corporation which consisted of producing and mar-
keting the products of the farm. 
Section 16-10-74, U.C.A. (1953) provides that a sale 
of all or substantially all the property and assets with 
or without good will of the corporation, if not made in 
the usual and regular course of business, may be made 
upon such terms and conditions and for such consider-
ation as may be authorized in the following manner: 
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution 
recommending such sale and directing the submission 
thereof to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which 
may be either an annual or special meeting. 
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(b) Written or printed notice shall be given to 
each shareholder of record entitled to vote at such meet-
ing within the time and in the manner provided in this 
Act for giving notice of meetings of shareholders, and 
whether the meeting be annual or special, shall state 
that the purpose of the meeting is to consider the pro-
posed sale. 
( c) At such meeting the shareholders may author-
ize such sale and may fix or may authorize the board 
of directors to fix any or all of the terms and conditions 
tlwrpof and the consideration to be received by the cor-
poration therefor. Each outstanding share of the cor-
poration shall be entitled to vote thereon, even though 
such shareholder may not, under the provisions of the 
Articl\:'s of Incorporation, be entitled to a vote. Such 
authorization shall require the affirmative vote of at 
lt>ast a majority of the outstanding shares of the cor-
poration. 
( d) After such authorization by a vote of share-
holders, the board of directors nevertheless, in its dis-
cretion, may abandon the sale subject to the rights of 
third partif's under any contracts relating thereto. 
It will be noted that the authority of a corporation 
to Sf'll substantially all of its property can only be exer-
cised by the board of directors, and that they must act 
as a unit. This means, of course, that the directors 
must meet, debate the subject and render a formal de-
cision fixing the terms of the sale. 
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In the case of Lochwitz vs. Mining <f; Milling Co., 
37 Utah 379, 108 P. 1128, it was expressly decided: 
"Again, under statutes similar to ours, a quo-
rum of the board of directors must act as a unit 
when discharging or when authorizing any one 
to execute corporate powers. ( 4 Thompson on 
Corps. 4619; 10 Cyc. 775.) The rule is well and 
tersely stated in Cyc. in the following language: 
'The board of directors to whom the au-
thority to bind the corporation is committed 
is not the individual directors scattered here 
and there, whose assent to a given act may 
be collected by a diligent canvasser, but it 
is the board sitting and consulting together 
in a body. Individual directors, or any num-
ber of them less than a quorum, have no 
authority as directors to bind the corpora-
tion. And this is equally the rule, although 
the director who assumes to do so may own 
a majority of the shares.'" 
The trial court held and the evidence is clear and 
positive that the board of directors of Arthur N. Grover 
Farms, Inc. never at any time authorized the contract 
of sale which is the subject matter of these actions. They 
never considered it either formally or informally. One 
of the directors had never heard about the purpm;ed sale 
until after it had been completed. 
Another director, Mrs. Estella Grover, was prac-
tically blind and so aged and infirm as to require con-
stant medical care and attention. There is nothing to 
indicate that she ever had any prior notice or informa-
tion of the sale until her signature to the contract was 
obtained at the last moment through the influence of 
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her husband. All of the negotiations leading up to the 
contract were conducted solely by Arthur N. Grover, 
who himself was so feeble, infirm and mentally disturbed 
that he was unabled to comprehend any of the conse-
quences of the proposed sale. 
The complete absence of any authorization from 
the board of directors of the corporation to make this 
sale is snch a vital and fundamental defect that we never 
reach the question whether it was approved by the stock-
holders. We accept the court's finding that it was not 
anthorized or approved by either the directors or the 
stockholders. 
The contract of sale was executed by Mrs. Grover 
as Yice President. Mr. Grover merely attested the in-
strument, that is, he certified to the seal of the corpo-
ration and the signature of the Vice President. Since 
neithPr of them was authorized by the board of directors 
to make any sale of the property of the corporation, 
their execution of the contract of sale on behalf of the 
corporation was without any legal force or effect. 
The cases of Aggeler, et al. vs. Blood, 73 Utah 120, 
272 P. 933; Anderson vs. Grantsville, etc., 51 Utah 137, 
169 P. 168; Stevens vs. First Natioanl Bank, 89 Utah 
456, 57 P.2d 1099; Lochwitz vs. Pine Tree, 37 Utah 349, 
108 P. 1128; Salt Lake Valley Loan, etc. vs. St. Joseph, 
etc., 73 Utah 256, 273 P. 507, fully sustain this funda-
mental proposition. 
The statute of California relating to sales of sub-
stantially all the assets of the corporation is substantially 
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the same as our Section 16-10-74. In Bickston vs. Federal 
Fire Arms Corporation, 38 Cal. Rptr. 793, a stockholder 
brought suit to recover for the wrongful disposition of 
corporate assets. These asset were diposed of without 
any authorization by the board of directors and without 
any resolution of the board directing the sale. The court 
held the sale invalid. We quote from the opinion: 
"It is clear from the evidence herein that the 
corporation, through the acts of Lippe, its presi-
dent and a stockholder, and of Evans and Worrall, 
stockholders, conveyed, exchanged, transferred or 
disposed of all or substantially all of its property 
and assets without compliance with the foregoing 
section of the Corporations Code. Concedely the 
corporate acts of paying substantially all of its 
assets in exchange for stock in the names of plain-
tiff and Lippe were without authority of a resolu-
tion of its board of directors and without the 
approval either by vote or written consent of its 
shareholders. 
(3) It is the rule in this state that, while a cor-
poration may dispose of all its assets and wind up 
its business when authorized by its directors and 
approved by a majority of the voting power of 
its stockholders, the officers or directors have no 
power to dispose of all or substantially all of its 
assets without fully complying with the said sec-
tion 3901. 
As said in J eppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34 
Cal. 2d 11, 15-16, 206 P. 2d 847, 849, 9 A.L.R. 2d 
1297: 'The reason for this limitation is that a 
corporation is organized for the purpose of doing 
business of some nature, and if so, its share-
holders have the right to insist that the corpora-
tion continue for the purpose for which it was 
organized. A sale, the,refore, of all its property, 
19 
or so much thereof as would prevent it from con-
tinuing in such business, would constitute a viola-
tion of the corporate contract.' 
( 4) The statute in question was enacted for 
the protection of shareholders and creditors of the 
corporation, and they alone have the right to 
object to the transfer of corporate assets in vio-
lation of the code section. Transactions. such as 
those herein made, are violative of the provisions 
of the statute, are voidable and may be rescinded 
and set aside at the election of a shareholder or 
creditor, for whose benefit alone the statute was 
enacted. ( Solorza v. Park Water Co., 86 Cal 
App. 2d 653, 658-659, 195 P. 2d 523.) Plaintiff 
is such a stockholder and creditor." 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ANY ESTOP-
PEL OF THE CORPORATION TO DENY 
THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT. 
\Ve have demonstrated that the contract of sale em-
braced all or substantiall~· all of the assets of the corpo-
ration and was not a sale in the usual course of business 
and not binding because neither Estella V. Grover nor her 
lmshand, Arthur N. Grover, had any authority from the 
board of directors to make any sale or to execute the con-
tract of sale. 
There is no need to pursue this point further because 
the trial court, both in its memorandum opinion and in its 
findings of fact, determined that the contract of sale was 
not authorized by any action of the board of directors 
or the stockholders of the corporation Its decision that 
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the contract \Vas binding upon tlw corporation was based 
solely upon the ground of estoppel. The first question for 
determination on this appeal is whether there is an.'· basis 
in this record for such an t•stoppel. \Ve maintain that 
there is not. 
The trial court creates the estoppel from a finding 
that Mr and Mrs. Grover "were the true owners of this 
corporation at the time of the transaction as they had 
theretofore been the owners of the farm prior to the for-
mation of the corporation." It then proceeds to "pierce 
the corporate veil" and hold the ''corporation bound by 
the acts of thos0 who owned the company when the deal 
was made." 
This is the first time that an.'· court, so far as we 
can determine, ever "pierced a corporate veil" in order 
to validate a totally unauthorized sale of the corporation's 
assets for the sole benefit of one or another of its officers. 
The only situation in which Utah courts have ever allowed 
the piercing of the corporate veil was to prevent the 
commission of a fraud or perpetration of a wrong. SeP 
Geary vs. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396. 
In order to pierce the corporate yeil tlw court had to 
find that Mr. and Mrs. Grover were tlw "true" O\\·ners 
of the corporation, that is, that they owned all of the stock 
and used the corporation as a naked instrumentality for 
conducting their own private affairs. Such a finding 
cannot be sustained. It is undisputed that at the time 
the sale to defendants was made the stock of the corpora-
tion was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Grover and their eight 
children. One of children became a stockholder at the 
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time the corporation >ms created. Forty shares of the 
stock issued to Mrs. Grover at the time of the incorpora-
tion had been given by her to her children before the sale 
in controversy took place. rrhere may be some question 
in the evidence as to when the certificates were actually 
delivered to the children, but it is immaterial so far as 
this case is concerned wh<c•ther the certificates were ever 
actually delivered. See Nielson vs. Leamington, 87 Utah 
69, 48 P.2d 439. Certificates of stock are mPrely evidence 
of muniments of title. See Rock vs. Gustaveson Oil Com-
pany, 59 Utah 431, 204 P. 96. Delivery of the certificate 
is not an essential to transfer of ownership. See National 
Bank vs. Beckstead, G8 rtah 421, 250 P. 1033; Rouey us. 
Hardy, 63 Utah 231, 224 P.889. 
A share of stock is a chose in action and it may be 
transferred as any other chose of action may be trans-
ferred. It is purely a matter of intention of the owner to 
part ·with his interest. If that intention is clearly express-
ed, either orally or in writing, it will be given effect. 
There is no controversy in this action between any 
of the Grovers as to the ownership of the stock. The evi-
dence is uncontradicted that at the time the contract of 
sale was made, each of the eight chidren of Mr. and Mrs. 
Grover was a stockholder in thecorporation and entitled 
to vote and to attack the validity of the sale. 
The stock book likewise affirms the ownership of 
stock in the children. The defendants make no claim to 
any of the stock and they are in no way concerned with 
the title or ownership as between the members of the 
Grover family. 
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'11he stock of the corporation was issued in exchange 
for the property conveyed to it by Mr. and Mrs. Grover. 
There is and can be no question concerning their right to 
distribute this stock among their children in any manner 
they saw fit. They did distribute a very substantial por-
tion of this stock to the children prior to the ex~ution 
of the contract of sale. 
The very purpose of creating this family corporation 
and transferring the farm property to it was to avoid 
the expense of probate and to vest in the children a 
present equitable interest in the land. 
The court's finding upon the question of stock owner-
ship of the corporation is ambiguous and uncertain. There 
is no clear-cut finding that all of the stock of the corpora-
tion was vested solely in Mr. and Mrs. Grover. Admittedly 
one share was issued to the daughter Fay, and the actual 
finding of the court with respect to the stock ownership 
of the other children is simply that they did not have 
actual possession of the written certificates until after 
the sale. In any event a finding that the coropration is a 
mere instrumentality of the Grovers and that the owner-
ship of the real property remained in them, notwithstand-
ing the conveyance to the corporation, is without any 
support whatever in the record. 
The case of Geary v. Cain, supra, presents a similar 
situation so far as the status of the corporation is con-
cerned. The plaintiff in that case obtained a money judg-
ment against Addison Cain. She then brought suit against 
the Doris Trut Company to subject the property of the 
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corporation to the payment of the money judgment 
against Cain. Plaintiff asserted that Doris Trust Com-
pany was the alter ego and agent of Addison Cain and 
that the property which he had conveyed to the corpora-
tion in exchange for the stock was in reality the property 
of Addison Cain, notwithstanding the conveyance. The 
books of the corporation showed that part of the stock 
of the Doris Trust Company belonged to the wife and the 
children of Addison Cain. Plaintiff contended that any 
issue of stock to the wife or children was fictitious and 
without any consideration. The trial court found in 
accordance with plaintiff's contention, but the Supreme 
Court expressly repudiated the finding. This of course 
destroyed the foundation for any theory that the court 
could pierce the corporate veil. 
"A showing that Cain owns all, or substantially 
of the outstanding shares of the Doris Trust Com-
pany, or that the persons in whose names they 
stand hold the same in trust for him, is vital to the 
plaintiff's case under her first theory. Courts of 
equity and courts of law a well, and courts which 
administer both law and equity in the same action, 
as do the courts of this state, will, to prevent fraud 
and accomplish justice, in proper cases ignore the 
legal fiction that a corporation is a person sepa-
rate and distinct from the person or group of per-
sons who own its stock. Western Securities Co. v. 
Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 P. 856; D.l. Felsenthal Co. 
v. Northern Assurance Co., 284 Ill. 343, 120 N.E. 
268, 1 A.L.R. 602, and annotation on page 610." 
"The corporate entity cannot be ignored, where, 
as here appears, the stock is owned by the children, 
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and it does not appear that they hold title to the 
shares in trust for their father." 
* * * 
"The doctrine simply means that the courts, ig-
noring forms and looking to the substance of 
things will regard the stockholders of a corpora-
tion as the owners of its pro1wrty, or as the real 
parties in interest, whenever it is necessary to do 
to prevent a fraud which might otherwise be per-
petrated, to redress a wrong ·which might other-
wise fail. It cannot he applied in this case, which 
is an action against the corporation and a person 
who holds bnt onP shan' of its stock, so long as it 
appears that there an• other stockl10ldt>rs, ·who are 
not parties to tlw action, mrning all hut one of the 
ontstanding slian•s and it is not made to appear 
that t1wy hold the sa11w in trnst for Addison Cain." 
The conhonrsy in this litigation cannot be resolved 
by indulging in legal fictions and ignoring incontro-
vertible facts. TlH:' conrt exvressly found that Arthur N. 
Grover Farms, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and 
existing under and by virtue of tlw laws of the State of 
Utah and that it is the owner of the fnll title to the farm 
covered by the contract of sale. It was organized hy 
members of the family of Arthur N. Gron>r and its char-
ter has never been abandoned, cancelled or revoked. Its 
affairs are managed and controlled by a board of direct-
ors. Its officers and directors are duly qualified to act 
as such. 
It is the owner in fee simple of the legal and equitable 
title to the farm involved in this litigation. It acquired 
its title and ownership by a valid and legal conveyance. 
It has been in possession of and has continuously operated 
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the farm smce it was organized. It has committed no 
fraud or other wrong upon the defendants or any of them. 
It is prosecuting the present action for the purpose of 
recovering property which has been sold without its con-
sent, authorization or approval. 
The uncontro\'erted facts establish, and the trial court 
found, that the officers who signed the contract of sale 
had no authority to do so. There is not a word of evi-
dence, either oral or written, which precludes the corpo-
ration from asserting the absence of such authority. The 
defendants expressly admit that they knew at the outset of 
any negotiations that the farm belonged to the corpor~ 
tion, that the directors of the corporation were Mr. and 
.:\frs. Grover and their daughter, Mrs. Fay Wight, and 
that Mrs. ·wight was President. 'rhey knew also that 
.Mrs. Grover ·was Yice President and Mr. Grover Secre-
tary-Treasurer. The Articles of Incorporation were a 
matter of public record and at all times available for in-
spection by the defendants. No one made any misrepre-
sentation or gave any erroneous information to any of 
the defendants with respect to the status of the property 
or of the corporation or its directors or officers. 
The defendants likewise knew, or are charged with 
the knowledge, that no meeting of the board of directors 
was ever held and that no resolution or other action of 
the board of directors was ever adopted or taken. No 
one represnted or stated to the defendants that the dir-
ectors or stockholders had considered the proposed sale 
or approved its terms. No one represented to the defend-
ants that either Mr. or Mrs. Grover had any authority 
L 
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from the directors or stockholders to enter into the sale 
contract on behalf of the corporation. 
Not only were the defendants aware of the fact that 
neither the directors nor the stockholders authorized or 
approved the sale, but they were affirmatively advised by 
one of the stockholders that no such authorization had 
been given. They were warned that if they took posses-
sion of the farm, they would be acting at their peril. 
There is a total absence of any prior transactions of 
a similar character conducted by any of the officers or 
directors. There is no pretense that any of the defendants 
were misled or deceiYed in any manner by any previous 
dealings or contacts with any of the plaintiffs. The de-
fendants entered into the contract with their eyes wide 
open and with full information and knowledge of the 
status and authority of the parties with whom they were 
dealing. 
POINT III 
THE GROVERS ARE NOT PARTIES TO 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE, DID NOT EX-
ECUTE IT AS INDIVIDUALS AND ARE 
NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE UNDER IT. 
The trial court found that the Grovers executed the 
contract of sale in their individual and also in their offi-
cial capacities, and are liable to the defendants for the 
sum of $525.00, the value of grazing rights, and abo the 
sum of $5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 
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The finding is manifestly erroneous. 
Neither of the Grovers is a party to the contract of 
sale and neither of them signed it in an individual capa-
city. .Mrs. Grover signed the contract on behalf of the 
corporation in her capacity of Vice President. Mr. 
Grover did not sign the contract either in his individual 
capacity or on behalf of the corporation. He merely 
attested the instrument. 
The contract contains no prov1s10n purporting to 
impose any liability on anyone except the corporation. 
There is not a word, either in or out of the contract of 
sale, to indicate any intention on the part of either of the 
Grovers to assume any personal responsibility under 
the contract. 
There is like\vise no basis for holding the Grovers 
personally liable upon any theory of breach of implied 
warranty of authority. No such theory of liability was 
asserted by the defendants in the court below and there 
is no finding of any such breach. To sustain the theory, 
it is incumbent upon the defendants to establish that they 
were ignorant of the lack of authority of the Gron'rs and 
that they relied upon the implied warranty. The evidence 
in the case controverts both these points. As we have al-
ready sho,,-n, the defendants knew or had the means of 
knowing that no directors' meeting had ever been held 
or that the directors ever authorized or considered the 
sale. They were notified before the sale was completed 
that it was unauthorized and would be contested. 
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:Keither of the Grovers made any oral or written 
statement or representation that they had been author-
ized by the directors to make the sale or execute the con-
tract. None of the defendants \Vas in any manner induced 
or persuaded not to investigate the powers or authority 
of the Grovers to bind the corporation. Under such cir-
cumstances, there is no basis for holding tht: Uronrs in-
dividually liable upon the theory of a breach of implied 
warranty of authority. Deciding this very qnesttion is 
McDonald vs. Liickenbach, 170 Fed. 434. In this case the 
president and secretary executed a promissory note 
on behalf of the corporation. They also endorsed the note 
in their individual capacity. '11lwy were released from 
their liability as endorsers by the failure of the holder of 
the note to make timely presentatio11 or demand upon the 
maker. The payee sought to hold the defendants person-
ally liable as makers of the note upon the theory of im-
plied brPach of warranty of anthorit_\-. The Court of 
Appeals held that since the l)laintiff had knowledge of 
the lack of anthority, thPre could be no breach of an im-
plied warranty. It said: 
"Bnt an absolutely determining factor in this 
case is that the third party, the payee in the note, 
is not shown to han• been without knowle-dgt', as 
to the infirmit.'- of thP pa1wr, if an:-·. In fact, he 
had all the information in this respect that the 
defendant had." 
We have already pointed out that the corporation 
cannot be treated as a mere instrumentality of the 
Grovers or as thPir alter ego because there are no equit-
able considerations requiring it and no fraud or wrong-
doing to bP circnmnnted. The corporation was not or-
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ganized for any unlav,rful purpose and the Grovers did 
not convey their property to it to conceal it from creditors. 
The defendants have not been misled or deceived by any-
thing done or onutted by the Grovers. 
Even if it were a fact (which it is not) that the 
Grovers ovmed all of the stock, the corporation cannot be 
treated as their alter ego or vice versa. 
"In order to cast aside the legal fiction of dis-
trict corporate existence as distinguished from 
those who own its capital stock, it is not enough 
that it is so organized and controlled and its af-
fairs so managed as to make it 'merely an instru-
mentality, conduit or adjunct' of its stockholders, 
but it must further appear that they are the 'busi-
ness conduits and alter ego of one another,' and 
that to recognize their separate entities would aid 
the consummation of a wrong. Divested of the 
essentials which we liave enumerated, the mere 
circumstance that all the capital stock of a corpo-
ration is o'nwd or controlled by onP or more per-
sons does not, and should not, destroy its separate 
existence; were it otherwise, few private corpora-
tions could preserve their distinct indentity, (sic) 
which wonld mean the complete destruction of the 
primary object of their organization." Erken-
brcch!:'r vs. Grant, 200 Pac. 641. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS PREP AR-
ED BY THE GROYERS AND THEIR AT-
TORNEY. 
Mr. Arthur N. Grover testified that the original con-
tract agreement, Exhibit 33, was typed in the bank by the 
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bank President, Mr. Nelson. Mr. Ndson, who is not a 
lawyer, denied that he prepared this document. He stated 
it was brought into the bank in executed form and that 
he had nothing to do ·with its preparation (R. 449). His 
testimony was : 
''I liave never seen that contract until j11st a few 
days ago." 
"Q. Have you ever seen an instrument, the ori-
ginal or a cop~v of what I am showing yon, 
which is Exhibit 33?" 
A. I have nevn seen it." (R. 472). 
After defendants' Exhibit 33 had bet•n sigm·d, l\lr. 
Grover returned to the hank and, according to tlw testi-
mony of the hanker, had with him the l'XPc·utPd contrad, 
Exhibit 49 and also an Pscrow agrPPmPnt, Exhibit 48. 
Exhibit 49 ·was ad.mittPdl~· prPpared in thP office of Mr. 
Skeen. However, the banhr states that he had nothing 
to do with the preparation of the Pscrow agreement (J~x. 
48). 
'l'he incontrovertible fact is, plaintiffs' Exhibit 3;3 and 
the escrmv agreement wen· prepared in the bank on thP 
banker's tnwwriter by the banker. This fact is shown by 
the typing on E~xhibits 33, 48, 39, 36, 45 and 4G and is sup-
ported by the testimony of l\fr. Grover who tt'stifo•d 
they were pre1mred in the bank. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 3G and 39 are exemplars. They 
are admittedly typed on the hanker's typewriter and are 
admittedly t.vped by him. The plaintiffs called a hand-
writing expert, l\Iadge Alsop. Her testimony, contained 
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at pages 70G-72G, demonstrates conclusively that the es-
crow agreement and Exhibit 33 were both prepared on 
the same typewriter and probably by the same typist. 
The significance of this is that if they were prepared on 
the same typewriter, they were prepared in the bank by 
someone ·who was not a lawyer and by someone who was 
advising Mr. Grover as to the legal effects of his acts. 
There is no doubt that this >ms the banker and that the 
contract was made under his influence. 
Exhibits 45 and 46 are simple blowups of the ex-
emplars and the questioned documents. Examination of 
these questioned documents and exemplars, even without 
the use of the blowups, should convince any fact finder 
that the exemplars and the questioned documents were 
prepared on one and the same typewriter. 
One of the most significant facts is the figure "8" 
shown on plaintiffs' Exhibit 39 and Exhibit 36 and also 
on the escrow agreement. The type which makes the 
figure "8" has been damaged on the t:1)ewriter in ques-
tion so that a small irregularity is shmvn in the upper 
right-hand quadrant. This irregularity shows on the S's 
m the questioned documents and in the exemplars. 
The importance of this testimony places the onus of 
influencing the negotiations which resulted in a prelimi-
nary contract which was subsequently formalized into Ex-
hibit 49, on Mr. Nelson, who represented both buyer and 
seller in a legal capacity and points up the damage which 
occurs when people receive legal advice from those not 
competent to give advice. This is particularly so when 
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the seller was old. infinn and, according to the only doc-
tors who examined him and who testified, incompetent 
to comprehend and understand what he was doing. 
No lawyer would have drawn up an escrow agree-
ment such as that identified in plaintiffs' Exhibit 48, nor 
would a lawyer have in any way participated in the pre-
paration of an agreement such as that identified by plain-
tiffs' Exhibit 33. Those agreements formed the basis of 
the sale made and define the obligations of the seller and 
buyer. 
There is a ready explanation for the failure of Mr. 
Nelson to tell the truth with respect to his participation 
in the transaction. The contract would enable the Garns 
to pay for the property without spending any of their 
own money and also be in a much better position to pay 
off their large obligation to Mr. Nelson's bank. 
SUMMARY 
Appellants accept the trial court's finding and de-
terrnination that the contract of sale was not authorized 
by the board of directors of Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc. 
or by its stockholders and that the requirements of Sec-
tion lG-10-74, U.C.A. (1953) were not complied with. In-
herent in this finding and determination is the conclu-
sion that neither Estella V. Grover nor Arthur N. Grover 
had any authority to execute the contract on behalf of the 
corporation. These findings are fully established by the 
evidence. 
33 
It is uncontroverted that the contract of sale covered 
substantially all the assets of the coropration and that the 
sale was not made in the usual course of business of the 
corporation. 
We also accept the finding of the trial court that 
Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc. is a corporation duly or-
ganized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah; 
that the directors of the corporation were Arthur N. 
Grover, Estella V. Grover and Fay G. Wight; that Fay 
G. Wight was President, Estella V. Grover, Vice Presi-
dent, and Arthur N. Grover, Secretary and Treasurer; 
that the farm land covered by the contract of sale was 
owned by Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover, his 
wife, prior to the conveyance thereof to the corporation; 
and that the property was conveyed to the corporation 
in exchange for shares of stock. 
We deny any findings that all of the stock of the 
corporation was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Grover at the 
time the contract of sale was executed and contend that 
the uncontradicted evidence proves that at that time the 
stock of the corporation was owned by Mr. and Mrs. 
Grover and their eight children. 
We contend that the plaintiffs are not estopped to 
deny that the sale of the property to the defendants and 
the execution of the contract were unauthorized or that 
the contract of sale is invalid and unenforceable. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants 
had full knowledge and the means of obtaining full knowl-
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edge with respect to the lack of authority of the Grovers 
to sell or convey the farm lands to the defendants or to 
bind the corporation or to execute the contract on behalf 
of the corporation. The defendants were notified before 
the transaction ·was consmmnated that the Grovers had 
no authority to sell the property or to execute the contract 
on behalf of the of the corporation. 
vVe contend that there is no basis in law or in fact 
for piercing the corporate veil and disn~garding the 
separate identity of the corporation and treating it as a 
mere instrumentality or alter ego of the Grovers. There 
are no equitable considerations which require that the 
separate identity of the Grnvers and the corporation be 
ignored and there is no fraud or wrong to be circum-
vented. 
N eithc>r of the Gro\·en; assnnwd any iwrsonal lia-
bility under the contract of salP. They are not parties 
to the contract and they did not execute it as incliYiuuals. 
It ·was executed h>- :;\frs. Gronr on behalf of the corpo-
ration and in her capacity of Yice President. It was at-
tPsted by .Mr. Grover as SPerPtary of the corporation. 
Neither of tlw Grovers can be hPld iwrsonally liable 
for any breach of implied warrant>· of authority becansc> 
the defendants had full knowledgP and the means of full 
knowledge of the lack of authority in the Grovers to bind 
the corporation. They did not rely npon an>· implied 
warranty of authority. 
Appellants contend that the finding of the court be-
low that both Mr. and l\Irs. Grover at tlw time of th(_• 
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execution of the contract possessed wfficient mental 
capacity to enter into the agreement and were physically 
and mentally capable of understanding and appreciating 
the nature and effect of the transaction, and did so un-
derstand and appreciate, and exercised their own free 
will in the l'Xecution thereof, is contrary to the evidence 
which discloses that l\Irs. Grover at that time was aged, 
infirm and suffering from heart trouble, and required 
('Onstant medical care and attention; that she was prac-
ti('ally blind and unable to read any docunwnt ·without the 
aid of a magnifying glass; that she did not read the con-
tract of sale and did not know or understand its contents 
or its legal signficance; that in signing the contract, she 
acted solely under the influence and }Jersuasion of her 
husband and undPr a lack of understanding of the nature 
and legal effect of th0 contract; that Mr. Grover was 
himself ag('d, infirm, ill and unable to understand and 
appreciate the legal effect of the contract of sale. 
\Ve also maintain that it is immmaterial whether 
Pither Mr. or Mrs. Grover was legally competent to make 
or en1er into a contract of sale of the prorwrty because 
neither of them made or entered into any contract with 
tlw defendants or incmTed any liability or assumed any 
obligaion nnder it. 
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the con-
tract of sale was not authorized by the board of directors 
nor approved by the stockholders; that the officers who 
executed it had no authority to do so; it is void and of 
no legal force or effect and should be canceled and set 
aside; that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Grover are parties to the 
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contract of sale or assumed any obligation or liability 
thereunder; that the judgment and decree appealed from 
is erroneous and should be vacated and set aside and the 
trial court directed to enter its judgment and decree 
canceling the contract of sale and requiring the def end-
ants to account for their operations of the farm alld the 
rents, issues and profits received by th~m. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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